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Each year, as April 15 approaches, we are forced to spend 
some moments thinking about our income tax system. There 
is, and has been, a great deal of dissatisfaction with our 
system. There is a general consensus that others are paying 
less than their fair share.
Popular concern has focused on the inequities and complex 
ities of the system. Economists' concerns have been centered 
not only on these matters, but also on the inefficiencies to 
which our tax system allegedly gives rise.
The dissatisfaction has been so great that President Reagan 
made tax reform one of the highest priority items in his 
agenda for his second term. In spite of the importance he 
attached to it, there has not yet been a tax reform bill as of this 
writing. But by now, the outlines of what is likely to pass  
and there is a consensus that a bill will pass has emerged. It 
is not the tax reform bill that President Reagan had hoped 
would lead to the Second American Revolution. It is certainly 
not the tax reform bill about which economists had dreamed.
Why and to what extent do I think the bill which is likely to 
emerge will represent a failure of the movement to reform our 
income tax system? What lessons can we learn from this 
seeming failure of reform? What implications does it have for 
how the government should raise the revenues required to 
finance its operations? These are the questions which I shall 
address this evening. First, however, I should like to review
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some of the economists' traditional principles concerning tax 
design and some facts concerning the consequence of a tax 
system.
Some Basic Propositions Concerning the Effects of 
Taxation
There are five basic facts concerning the consequences of a 
tax system I should like to mention.
First, the inefficiencies associated with a tax system what 
economists' call the dead weight loss of the tax system are 
associated with the marginal tax rates, the extra tax an 
individual pays for the extra dollar of income. This determines 
the extent to which the tax system distorts the decision of 
whether to work more, to retire later, to stay in school longer, 
or to save more. 1 Our tax system has been criticized for its 
high marginal tax rates, though the levels today are far lower 
than they were some years ago.
Second, any tax system that taxes different incomes  
whether income to different individuals or income received in 
different forms opens itself to the possibility of what we call 
tax arbitrage, the attempt to change the form in which 
transactions occur, or to engage in transactions the purpose of 
which is to reduce total tax liabilities. Let me illustrate.
Because capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than 
ordinary income, there is an incentive for individuals to 
attempt to reap their returns in the form of capital gains. In an 
inflationary period, real estate values are often much higher 
than the depreciated basis of an asset. If an individual who is 
at a low income tax bracket sells his real estate to a high 
bracket individual, the former will have to pay a tax on his 
capital gain;2 but this is more than offset by the advantages 
arising from the higher depreciation allowances accruing to
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the high tax individual. 3 In these circumstances, the tax system 
thus gives rise to an incentive to churn assets.
Perhaps the most notorious tax arbitrage activities growing 
out of the 1981 Tax Bill were those associated with Safe 
Harbor Leasing. Firms that did not have the income against 
which to offset their accelerated depreciation allowances and 
investment tax credits arranged for other firms with surplus 
income in quite different lines of business nominally to 
purchase machines for them; they would then lease the 
machines back. Thus Chrysler might arrange to have its 
machines purchased by, say, Exxon. But it was a pure paper 
charade. Chrysler would have purchased the machine by 
borrowing, say, 80 percent from a bank, and putting up 20 
percent of its own capital. Chrysler might now pay Exxon 20 
percent as the first lease payment, and Exxon would borrow 
the remaining 80 percent from the same bank. Exxon has done 
nothing but sign some papers. In fact, the tremendous tax 
advantages which would accrue to Exxon mean that it would 
be willing to pay a considerable amount, perhaps enough to 
relieve Chrysler of most of its earlier payments.4 Notice that it 
is the difference in tax bracket between Chrysler and Exxon 
which provides the motivation for these transactions.
These tax arbitrage activities have several consequences. 
First, they make it difficult to ascertain the true incidence of 
the tax structure who really pays the taxes. Thus, there has 
been considerable publicity given to the failure of several of 
the major American corporations to pay any taxes in recent 
years, largely because of these leasing arrangements. But in 
most cases, the companies, like Exxon and GE, who "buy" 
the machine and lease it nominally taking the tax advan 
tages are not the true beneficiaries: rather it is the companies 
in dire straits (Chrysler, for example) to whom more than 85 
percent of the benefits accrue. The result is little different from
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what it would be if the government made the investment tax 
credit cashable (that is, a company with zero income would 
receive a check from the government); or if the government 
allowed individuals to defer taking advantage of the tax credit 
until the firm had a positive income, but credited the firm with 
interest for the deferment (as most economists believe should 
be done).
(Similar issues arise in interpreting who gets the benefits 
from the provisions of tax exemption of interest on state and 
local bonds. A significant fraction of those benefits accrue to 
the municipalities, not to the individuals, who earn lower 
returns on those bonds than they would on taxable bonds.)
Furthermore, tax arbitrage activities undo some of the 
distortions which would otherwise be associated with the tax 
system. In the example given above, in the absence of leasing, 
the marginal cost of investment for a firm with no income 
against which to offset its investment tax credit and its 
accelerated depreciation allowances (Chrysler) is greater than 
for a company with a high income (Exxon). It is questionable 
whether, as a matter of national policy, we would wish to 
introduce discriminatory legislation of that form. Leasing 
undoes this distortion.
At the same time, tax arbitrage often does lead to distor 
tions in economic activities. While pure tax arbitrage has no 
effect other than to induce certain paper transactions, that is, 
the only dead weight loss is the transaction costs, much of the 
activity which I loosely refer to as tax arbitrage is not pure. To 
take advantage of the special provisions for capital gains, 
individuals may be induced to purchase real estate (because it 
is easier to obtain loans against property, and thus take 
advantage of the differential treatment between the full de- 
ductibility of interest and the 40 percent taxation of long-term 
capital gains).5
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Finally, these tax arbitrage activities probably imply that 
the true degree of progressivity of the tax system is less than 
the nominal degree of progressivity. Wealthier individuals are 
in a position to take advantage of these tax avoidance 
activities (and have a greater motive to do so). This is, in fact, 
one of the reasons for the widespread dissatisfaction with our 
current tax system.
The third basic fact concerning the effects of taxation is a 
simple and seemingly obvious one, but one which has been 
obfuscated in the current debate: it is individuals who bear all 
taxes. Corporations may pay taxes, but ultimately, the burden 
of all taxation must rest upon individuals the managers or 
workers of the corporation, the shareholders, or the custom 
ers.
The fourth basic fact concerning the assessment of the 
effects of taxation is that the effects of any tax cannot be 
assessed in isolation: it is the impact of the whole tax structure 
which is relevant. This is true with respect to an evaluation of 
both the efficiency and equity consequences. Thus, the mar 
ginal tax rate which is relevant for distorting individual 
behavior is not just the rate imposed by the federal income 
tax, but the total marginal rate, taking into account social 
security taxes (and benefits), state income taxes, and sales 
taxes.
The final basic fact that is particularly important in assess 
ing the consequences of tax changes is that taxes on capital 
assets are capitalized; that is, the price of existing assets 
reflects future anticipated tax changes. Thus, if there are 
particular assets which are taxed at higher (or lower) rates 
than other assets, it is not the current owners who bear the 
burden of the tax (or receive the benefits), but the owners of 
the asset at the time the tax was imposed (or the favorable 
treatment granted). 6 As a consequence, changes in the tax
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treatment of particular capital assets may have enormous 
effects on current owners of assets. Moreover, removing the 
favorable treatment accorded some class of assets does not 
necessarily remove the inequity created when the favorable 
treatment was granted, but may compound the inequities: for 
the current owner, who is hurt by the removal of the favorable 
treatment, may well not be the same individual who owned it 
at the time the favorable treatment was granted. Conversely, 
removing the discriminatory treatment on some class of assets 
may not provide compensation for those who incurred losses 
at the time the discriminatory treatment was imposed.7
Principles of Taxation
In evaluating the desirability of a tax system, economists 
have traditionally invoked five principles:
A good tax system should be equitable, first vis-a-vis its 
treatment of individuals in roughly similar economic straits 
(the principle of horizontal equity)., and second, vis-a-vis its 
treatment of individuals in different economic circumstances 
(the principle of vertical equity). There is one aspect of these 
principles of fairness to which I would like to call attention: 
the difficulty of ascertaining what an individual's fair contri 
bution is, and of devising ways of implementing whatever 
principle one adopts within a legal code. There is a widespread 
belief that income is the appropriate basis of taxation, a good 
surrogate for ability to pay. Yet virtually all economists and 
most noneconomists would agree that income should not be 
measured on a daily, or weekly basis. Most economists would 
argue that the appropriate time unit is the individual's lifetime 
income; that is, the government should not penalize those 
individuals whose incomes have fluctuated over their life time, 
as our progressive tax structure does. But a lifetime income 
tax is, in fact, equivalent to a consumption tax (with appro-
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priate treatment of bequests and inheritances). Thus, if one 
believes in a lifetime income tax, one should exempt interest 
income, which can be viewed as a discriminatory tax on those 
who prefer to consume goods later on in their lives.
Third, a good tax system should "minimize" the distortions 
it introduces (the principle of efficiency).
A fourth principle is that a good tax system should not 
impose undue administrative costs, either directly, or indirect 
ly, on the parties being taxed.
This leads me to the fifth principle of a good tax system, one 
about which there is not universal agreement: a good tax 
system is one in which individuals know what they are paying. 
I sometimes refer to this as the principle of political responsi 
bility. Just as we believe it is only fair that lenders tell their 
potential borrowers what the interest rate they charge is, and 
that manufacturers of food tell their potential customers what 
ingredients are contained in the packages they sell, so too it is 
only right that the government should tell its citizens what 
each, individually, is contributing to the support of public 
services. The reason that I say there is not universal agreement 
on this principle is that just as lenders often argue that the 
truth-in-lending law just confuses potential borrowers, scaring 
them off from doing what they intuitively know is in their own 
best interests, so, too, some politicians are concerned that 
truth-in-government legislation would simply confuse tax 
payers and induce them to vote for smaller budgets than they 
otherwise would, leading to a cutback in important public 
services.
There are, of course, important trade-offs among these 
principles. A more progressive ("vertically equitable") tax 
system is likely to have a greater dead weight loss.
Some of the distinctions we introduce into our tax system, 
e.g., concerning the deductibility of medical expenses are there
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because we believe that they increase the equity of the tax 
system; those who have had to pay large medical expenses 
have a lower ability to pay than those who have not. But at the 
same time, they introduce further inequities. There are two 
types of error in any tax system: some individuals (of a given 
income) who should have had their taxes reduced (because of 
their special circumstances) do not get a tax reduction; and 
some individuals who should not have had their taxes reduced 
do get a tax reduction. If we tighten rules for medical 
deductibility, more individuals who should get a tax reduction 
do not; but fewer individuals who should not have gotten a 
tax reduction do. There is a trade-off in the two types of error.
There is, moreover, a trade-off between simplicity and 
equity. To make fine distinctions (e.g., between those who do 
or do not get a medical deduction) requires a complex law; to 
simply disallow deductions is simple, but may be unfair.
An Assessment of the Current Reforms
With these principles and facts in mind, let us review the 
direction that tax reform appears to be taking in order to 
ascertain the extent to which it conforms with these basic 
principles.
The major hallmark of the tax reform is the reduction in the 
top tax brackets from 50 percent, to 33 percent.8
The tax reform bill has not gone as far in base broadening 
as the advocates of reform would have liked. While only 
medical expenses in excess of 7.5 percent will be deductible, 
the far more important area of employer-provided health 
benefits has been left untouched. While state sales taxes will 
not be deductible, the more significant state income and local 
property taxes remain deductible.
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In retaining the provisions for the deductibility of mortgage 
interest, the government probably has undone much of its 
effort to reduce the tax deductibility of interest; individuals 
will simply substitute home equity loans for car loans as they 
were already doing before the new tax law. Again, the 
provision will have some impact, for example, on those 
individuals who itemize, but do not own a home; how 
significant a group this is, and whether this is a particular 
group which should be penalized, are questions we should ask 
ourselves.
Capital gains will be taxed at full rates. This has one distinct 
advantage; it eliminates one of the most important sources of 
tax arbitrage. But the raising of the tax rate on capital gains by 
more than half, from the current effective maximum rate of 20 
percent to 33 percent, may have serious consequences for 
economic efficiency. Moreover, most economists would argue 
that it is real capital gains, not nominal capital gains, which 
should be taxed.
The major effort of the government in simplifying the tax 
system has been to replace the system of many tax brackets 
with three tax brackets. This, I think, is an inconsequential 
simplification. There is little work associated with looking up 
one's tax in the tax tables. In other respects, the new tax law 
may actually make life more complicated.
One of the more popular proposals for dealing with the 
inequities which will remain within our tax system, given the 
seeming inability to redesign the tax structure to eliminate the 
major "loopholes," is to impose a minimum tax. There is, 
again, less to this than meets the eye. As we have noted, many 
of the prosperous firms who pay little tax do so because of 
leasing provisions. Forcing these firms to pay a minimum tax 
will not seriously disadvantage them because most of the 
benefits of the leasing provisions accrue to the less well-off
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firms. Thus, the minimum tax may actually work more to the 
disadvantage of the less well off, and will increase the distor 
tions associated with our tax system.
Most of the currently discussed tax reform proposals entail 
shifting the burden of taxation from the individual to the 
corporation; this violates the principle of political responsibil 
ity. The proponents of this either simply ignore the fact that it 
is individuals who must bear the burden of taxation, or are 
engaged in a political swindle: precisely because it is not easy 
to recognize who bears the burden makes such taxes politi 
cally desirable. (There is a third reason for the corporation 
tax, to which I shall return later: the belief that it is share 
holders and managers who bear the burden, but direct income 
taxation is an ineffective way of getting revenue from these 
individuals.)
This list of criticisms is not meant to be exhaustive, but 
merely to be indicative of the extent to which current propos 
als ignore some of the basic principles of taxation.
The Reasons for the Failure of Tax Reform
Indeed, though it may be too soon to make a final 
pronouncement, I am willing to venture that at least from 
the perspective of most economists the tax bill which finally 
emerges from Congress will be a failure; it will fall short of a 
major reform dreamed of a little more than two years ago. 
What are the reasons for this failure? I want to suggest three 
contributing factors.
First, economists have failed to convince the public and 
those involved in political decision making of the appropri 
ateness of their models. This is partly because some of the 
models are, in fact, inappropriate, and it is hard for the 
nonspecialist to distinguish among those which are and those
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which are not. This has left the politician in the position of 
selectively using economists' arguments: when they wish to 
reduce tax rates (to reduce the degree of progressivity), they 
refer to supply-side effects and economic efficiency; when they 
wish to subsidize smokestack America, they ignore the econ 
omists' advice concerning the desirability of investment 
neutrality.
Let me give some examples of where the models that are 
predominately in use among economists seem, at best, ques 
tionable. Perhaps nowhere is there more evidence than in their 
analysis of the capital market and corporation taxation. Most 
economists' models assume that firms can borrow freely at the 
market rate of interest, and this assumption has lead econo 
mists to focus on the effect of taxation on the marginal cost of 
capital. This effect is undoubtedly important. But many firms 
face credit rationing and are unable to raise funds on equity 
markets (or it is prohibitively expensive for them to do so).9 
They are thus concerned with their after-tax resources, i.e., 
their average rate of taxation.
Equalizing marginal tax rates and equalizing average tax 
rates are two quite different matters, when investment patterns 
differ. One kind of neutrality does not imply the other kind of 
neutrality.
The economists' traditional tirade against IRAs misses the 
point that most individuals do not have easy access to 
borrowing, and may be induced to increase their savings by 
this kind of "gimmick." The evidence to date is mixed: 
wealthier individuals are more likely to take advantage of 
IRAs, but there is little evidence of the widespread tax 
arbitrage that economic theory would predict.
Indeed, even economists have been somewhat schizophrenic 
in their analyses of the effects of taxation within their tradi-
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tional neoclassical models. Their models, when strictly ap 
plied, simply fail to explain important aspects of individual 
and firm behavior. At crucial junctures, they have resorted to 
ad hoc assumptions in order to "resolve" what would appear 
to be, within the confines of their model, inexplicable paradox 
es. Let me mention a few instances. In some earlier work 
(Stiglitz 1983, 1985), I took the economists' standard models 
of the tax system and of the capital market (perfect capital 
markets) and showed that there were tax arbitrage activities 
which could completely eliminate all taxes on capital, and 
indeed, if carried far enough, all taxes on earned income as 
well. I also showed that the optimal behavior of the corpora 
tion entailed it never paying dividends (this has come to be 
called the dividend paradox); there are tax preferred ways of 
distributing funds from the corporate to the unincorporated 
sector (Stiglitz 1973). (I also showed that there were no 
efficiency losses from the corporation income tax for a firm, 
facing no uncertainty provided the firm pursues an optimal 
financial policy.) (Stiglitz 1973, 1976.) I do not necessarily 
believe the conclusions of these studies; I do not believe that 
the corporation tax is nondistortionary. I certainly do not 
believe that individuals have eliminated all taxes through tax 
arbitrage. But what these models show is how woefully 
inadequate the traditional economists' models are for analyz 
ing the consequences of taxes. This is not to say that some of 
the effects, which they have emphasized are not important. 
But I suspect that many politicians, not thoroughly indoctri 
nated into the economists' way of thinking, smell, if not a rat, 
at least a little mouse; they suspect something is wrong with 
the model, but are obviously not in a position to determine 
what it is.
Political decision makers may also be somewhat confused 
by the seeming vagaries of the profession. A quarter century 
ago, economists like Nicky Kaldor and Milton Friedman
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could write, quite convincingly, of the desirability of the 
consumption tax based on considerations of economic effi 
ciency, because it reduced the number of distortions. Then 
economists, following a rediscovery of Frank Ramsey's classic 
paper of the late 1920s (Ramsey 1927), realized that two small 
distortions might be better than one large distortion (one 
could not simply count distortions), and derived conditions 
under which an interest income tax would be economically 
efficient. But Ramsey had conducted his analysis on the 
assumption that there was no progressive income tax. When 
this was recognized, the presumption in favor of no interest 
income tax was restored. 10
Following this confusion, economists have switched their 
arguments for a consumption tax from a focus on economic 
efficiency to one on administrative simplicity: much of the 
complexity of the tax code, and most of the tax avoidance 
activities, are centered around the taxation of capital. (See 
Bradford 1986.)
There are further, quite convincing arguments for the 
abolition of the taxation of the return to capital. We alluded 
to one of these earlier: the belief that the appropriate time 
period for taxation is the individual's life time.
Moreover, much of the lost revenue from the abolition of 
the taxation of capital is income which, under an ideal tax 
system, would not be taxed anyway: nominal (as opposed to 
real) returns, including nominal capital gains. With real 
interest rates traditionally at less than 1 or 2 percent, the loss 
of revenue from the taxation of the real return to capital may 
be negligible (although the returns to risk-taking may not be 
insignificant).
On the one hand, one might contend that the abolition of 
the capital tax hardly constitutes a "solution" to the admin-
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istrative problem of taxing capital; on the other hand, if the 
revenues lost are not too great, if one believes that it is lifetime 
income which is the appropriate basis of taxation, and if much 
of the complexity and most tax avoidance activity are indeed 
associated with capital taxation, elimination of capital taxa 
tion becomes an attractive possibility. Yet this is not the route 
that the current tax reform has taken, largely because of the 
belief, whether mistaken or not, that it would be, or would 
appear to be, inequitable.
This brings me to the second explanation for the failure of 
tax reform. Our tax system is an important forum within 
which our national values become stated. In other words, 
what is at issue is more than just economics. We have seen this 
repeatedly.
The Jeffersonian ideal of a country of small farmers may be 
inappropriate for a modern industrial society, but we still 
believe that individuals should have the right to own their own 
house, to have an equity claim, so to speak, in America. I am 
not unsympathetic with this view, as contrary as it may seem 
to economists' traditional obsession with the neutrality be 
tween rental and owner-occupied housing. (As an aside, 
economists' modelling of the differences between these eco 
nomic arrangements leaves much to be desired; the central 
issues of moral hazard, the incentive effects of maintenance of 
one's own house, are, in this work, completely ignored.) 
House ownership has, I suspect, important effects on indivi 
duals' views of themselves and their relationship to their 
society; and it may have positively beneficial effects on voting 
behavior, and hence on the nature of local communities. (See 
Stiglitz 1986.)
The positive encouragement of ESOP plans (by which 
individuals obtain an equity share in the firms for whom they 
work) and IRAs can be justified on similar terms.
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Charity has always played an important role in the Amer 
ican ideal and the decentralized provision of public goods 
encouraged by the charitable contributions has had, overall, a 
tremendously positive influence on our society. Without its 
privately supported medical foundations and educational 
institutions, America would not be what it is today. Thus it is 
not surprising that the charitable deduction has been defended 
with such vehemence, and retained.
But once one recognizes the desirability of retaining the 
charitable deductions, it is hard to eliminate completely the 
deduction for local and state taxes, part of which perform 
functions not dissimilar to charity: the compulsory contribu 
tion of an elderly individual to support a local public school 
system in similar in many ways to his voluntary gift to support 
a local private university. 11
The third reason for the failure of tax reform is related to 
simple political economy considerations: there are vested 
interests who are willing to fight quite hard to retain the 
special provisions which benefit them. Some of this may be 
put down to simple greed. But I have increasingly become 
convinced that there is frequently more to it than that: we live 
in a complex world, where the consequences of various 
policies are hard to ascertain. Those who are in an industry 
know the industry better than anyone else, except perhaps the 
economists who have made a study of them; but for reasons I 
have already alluded to, the economists' model often appears 
to be suspect. Thus, economists might argue that risk markets 
work almost perfectly, but the lobbyist for the oil and gas 
industry may make a convincing case that this is not true, and 
that unless special tax provisions are given, the tax structure 
will adversely affect this important industry.
Moreover, as I have also argued, there is more at stake than 
just efficiency considerations: there are values. The housing
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industry may concede that mortgage deducibility is not 
neutral, but argue that is precisely why it is good.
The problem is to distinguish between legitimate argu 
ments, and those that are self-serving.
The political economy problems associated with taxation 
should not come as a surprise. Indeed, one can interpret the 
restrictions imposed on taxation within the Constitution as a 
recognition of them. The writers of the Constitution were well 
aware that certain forms of taxation could be used to discrim 
inate against different groups, and to favor other groups. The 
South, afraid that the more populous North would impose 
export taxes, to the South's disadvantage, succeeded in mak 
ing such taxes unconstitutional. But they failed to recognize 
that in a general equilibrium model, export taxes and import 
duties are equivalent, and the North was successful in impos 
ing these taxes with differential burdens on the South.
The writers of the Constitution also imposed a uniformity 
clause, though the recent decision of the Supreme Court in 
upholding the constitutionality of the exemption of North 
Slope oil from the windfall profits tax decimated what little 
force was left in this important provision.
As most of you may be aware, the Constitution also 
originally prohibited direct taxes (such as an income tax) on a 
basis other than per head. Whether they intuited the kinds of 
problems that we now face may be debated. But certainly the 
writers of the amendment allowing the income tax seem, at 
least in retrospect, to have been insufficiently aware of the 
abuses to which the power to impose that form of taxation is 
subject.
Where Do We Go From Here?
What lessons are there to be learned from this failure of tax 
reform? Where do we go from here?
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First, it appears to me that we have asked too much of our 
tax system. By asking more, we may have gotten less. We have 
been overly ambitious in our attempts to redistribute income 
through the tax system, and as a result, we have provided 
incentives for massive tax avoidance. We have attempted to 
address the energy crisis and other social ills with our tax 
system; from an administrative perspective, this may not be 
unreasonable. It may be cheaper, for example, to subsidize the 
rehabilitation of our inner cities through the tax system than 
to set up a grants program. But the overall loss in faith in the 
equity of our system of financing public services may not be 
worth the savings in administrative costs.
Second, I think one can safely conclude that a major 
revamping of our income tax system appears unlikely for the 
foreseeable future. It should be borne in mind that there are 
significant costs associated with continually revising our tax 
system; individuals find it difficult to plan for the future, and 
this, in itself, may be a discouragement to investment. Given 
that a general tax reform appears unlikely, the only way to 
reduce the inefficiencies and inequities associated with the tax 
system is to reduce the amounts of revenue that we seek to 
collect from it. Moreover, reducing the tax rates reduces 
incentives to engage in tax avoidance activities. 12
This leads me to a qualified support for the introduction of 
a value added (consumption-based) tax. Most economists 
have been suspicious of such a tax because it is equivalent to a 
proportional income (or consumption) tax (depending on the 
specific rules of the tax); thus the introduction of such a tax, 
in effect, serves to reduce the overall progressivity to the tax 
system. Moreover, it introduces an additional administrative 
apparatus. Why, economists have asked, have two adminis 
trative systems, when one can do just as well with one?
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What this argument ignores is the fact that there are also 
administrative costs associated with tax avoidance activities. 
Thus, while it might pay an individual to attempt to avoid a 20 
percent income tax, it might not pay him to engage in 
activities to avoid a ten percent income tax, and a separate set 
of activities to avoid a 10 percent value added tax. Moreover, 
the way these taxes are collected, in fact, means that there are 
different tax avoidance possibilities in each. Thus, the principle 
of multiple nets suggests that one might obtain a more 
equitable tax system, with indeed lower overall administrative 
costs per dollar raised, by having two separate systems. This 
principle of multiple nets can be used to justify two other 
aspects of our tax code. If we had a well-functioning estate 
and gift tax system, then a consumption tax, combined with 
such an estate and gift tax, might well be desirable. But our 
gift and estate taxes are far from perfect. We can think of our 
present tax system, which exempts much of life cycle savings 
(housing, IRAs, pensions, etc.) as an attempt to capture the 
returns to some of the capital which escape the estate gift tax 
net. The corporation tax may be justified on similar grounds.
I qualify my support for these proposals for a value added 
tax for two reasons. First, there will be pressures to have a 
nonuniform value added tax. The more differentiated the tax, 
the greater the administrative problems, and the more likely 
we are to wind up in the same quagmire that we now find 
ourselves in with respect to the income tax. Second, there is 
concern that political leaders will take advantage of consumer 
ignorance, of their inability to ascertain their true tax liabili 
ties, and that the imposition of the value added tax will 
provide a mechanism for an expansion of the scale of the 
public sector.
The growing recognition of what I call the "political 
economy problems," what the popular press refers to as the
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lack of restraint on government expenditures and govern 
ment's propensity to dispense favors to special interest groups, 
and what economists might loosely describe as the lack of 
optimality of political equilibrium 13 (see Atkinson and Stiglitz 
1980 or Stiglitz 1986), has given rise to a movement for 
constitutional restrictions on the level of government expen 
ditures and the size of the deficit.
Note that the change in the constitutional restrictions on 
the set of admissible taxes may be closely tied to concerns 
about the size of the public sector. Popular support for 
government expenditure programs may be much greater if one 
believes that someone else (or no one) pays for it. With a 
progressive income tax, or a corporation tax, one can be 
mislead into believing that it is the "rich" or "corporations" 
which pay. Many of our current programs might not be 
supported if we had to finance them out of a head tax. 14
That is one of the reasons I have emphasized earlier the 
importance of the principle of political responsibility in tax 
systems.
I have mixed feelings about these proposals for a constitu 
tional amendment. The dangers of the loss of flexibility from 
a constitutional amendment must be balanced against the 
possible advantages in ameliorating the problems with which 
we have been concerned here. Moreover, I am not convinced 
that the proposals I have seen will deal adequately with the 
problem. Restrictions in deficits, in the absences of an ade 
quate capital budget, give rise to incentives to sell government 
assets such as the sale of offshore oil and gas leases during the 
past few years merely to balance the books, regardless of 
long-term costs to the American taxpayer. Restrictions on 
government expenditures give rise to the use of tax expendi 
tures, loan guarantees, and other devices, regardless of their 
merits relative to direct expenditures. Nor do the standard
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proposals do anything to address directly the abuses of our 
tax system, i.e., the structure problems which are the center of 
concern of the tax reform movement.
There are no easy solutions. As an educator, I have a 
strong belief in the value of information. That is why I think 
it important to have some truth-in-government legislation, 
where the government details the tax burden imposed on each 
individual. 15 I also think this kind of forum you have been 
holding here this year on taxation, the objective of which is to 
increase the general understanding of the effects of our tax 
system, is vital. I am pleased and honored to have been invited 
to address you this evening, and to participate with you in 
these endeavors.
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NOTES
1. The marginal tax rate determines the magnitude of the substitution effect 
(at a given level of welfare, which is related to how the individual trades off 
consumption and leisure, or present consumption and future consump 
tion), the average tax rate determines the magnitude of the income effect. 
The total effect is the sum of the two. The inefficiency associated with the 
tax system is associated with the substitution effect. The absence of a 
significant total effect (with substitution and income effects offsetting each 
other) has often been confused with the absence of any distortionary effect.
2. And there may possibly be a tax at ordinary rates on the recapture of his 
depreciation.
3. Even taking into account recapture. See Stiglitz (1985).
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4. This description oversimplifies by ignoring the important risks which 
Exxon might face in the presence of a default on the part of Chrysler. One 
of the main consequences of the Safe Harbor Provisions were to reduce 
those risks.
5. In addition, the "at risk" provisions are more favorable in real estate.
6. Or more accurately, at the time that it became believed that such a tax 
would be imposed (or such a favorable treatment would be granted).
7. Or more accurately, at the time that it became believed that such a tax 
would be imposed (or such a favorable treatment would be granted).
8. The legislated top rate is 28 percent, but as individuals' incomes 
increase, there is a reduction in their exemptions (and standard deductions) 
so that the effective rate is 33 percent.
9. There are good reasons for this, based on theories of imperfect 
information. See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 1983) and Greenwald, Stiglitz, 
and Weiss (1984).
10. See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). More accurately, there are conditions 
under which there should be an interest income tax, and other conditions 
under which there should be an interest income subsidy. It appears difficult 
to ascertain empirically which of these conditions actually prevail.
11. The minimum tax may similarly be viewed as desirable, not because it 
actually increases equity, or because it increases efficiency, but because it 
represents a statement of values, that is, the principle that every one above 
a certain income level should pay at least 20 percent of his income to the 
government, and it should be transparent that he does so.
12. Though much of the cost of those activities may be the fixed costs 
associated with learning about how to avoid taxes. If that is the case, then a 
reduction in tax rates may not reduce tax avoidance activities substantially.
13. Or, indeed, the absence of an equilibrium (see Arrow 1951).
14. Similarly, the scope for redistribution at the local and state level is 
much different than at the national level. The extent of distribution which 
well emerges if responsibility for welfare is placed at the state and local 
level differs from that which will emerge if the locus of responsibility is at 
the national level.
15. There are obvious difficulties, because not even economists can agree 
on who pays the corporation tax. But these ambiguities can be noted in the 
"information" sheet sent to each individual.
